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Abstract: 
 
The Ramsey approach to optimal taxation and Ramsey tax rules have amassed substance 
in economic theory. However, they are often criticized on grounds of practicality, fairness, 
feasibility and some other aspects of designing actual tax policy. This paper contests 
these criticisms; it discusses how closely or remotely Ramsey rules are followed in 
designing tax policy. It argues that the most of these common criticisms, be it realistic, 
such as administrative and compliance costs, or be it rather abstract, such as fairness, 
are either unimportant or irrelevant for Ramsey taxation. The more important 
inadequacy of the traditional Ramsey tax models is the selective modelling of incentive 
effects of tax reforms and their limited applicability for designing tax policy in developing 
countries. 
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On Policy Relevance of Ramsey Tax Rules 
 
Nearly eighty years ago Frank Ramsey presented an approach to optimal taxation in an article in 
the Economic Journal of 1927. Ramsey’s main motivation was to design an optimal tax theory that 
identifies the distortion minimizing tax policy and the second best levels of taxes. Today, an open 
set of tax rules that contains Ramsey’s original tax rule and its numerous extensions, is known as 
Ramsey tax rules. The theory and the set of Ramsey tax rules, both of which have been through a 
continuous process of technical sophistication, have amassed enormous substance in economic 
theory. The advancement of the theory is mainly carried out by examining a range of general 
equilibrium models that emphasize on variations in standard assumptions regarding the 
decentralized market structures and equilibrium response of taxpayers. The main motivation of 
such extensions is to sharpen and extend the set of Ramsey tax rules. This journey has been 
exciting; the extent of variations in standard assumptions made and the ideas and dimensions of 
extensions undertaken in these general equilibrium models are captivating. This in turns has made 
the literature diverse, stimulating and competitive. 
 
The practical policy relevance of these rules has been, however, often subject to criticisms. Over 
the last three decades the optimal tax theory and Ramsey tax rules have been criticized on grounds 
of their limits in designing tax policy. Important contributions in this spirit include Shavell (1981), 
Slemrod (1990), Heady (1993), and Alm (1996). In most parts of this particular literature, it is 
often argued that optimal taxation is in fact largely irrelevant to realistic tax design, because it 
typically abstracts from a range of considerations associated with fiscal and societal institutions 
that are crucial elements in the normative and positive analysis of taxation. 
 
Mapping pure theory into policy is far from simple, and the philosophical debate between positive 
and normative aspects of tax rules is not new. Principles and normative benchmarks typically 
dictate intellectual forums. Establishing their policy relevance and political realism remains a 
different and at times an appealing challenge. This paper examines the mapping of celebrated 
Ramsey tax rules into practical fiscal policy design. It explores the Ramsey tax rules beyond their 
second best technical properties and attempts to evaluate their importance in addressing standard 
tax policy issues such as fairness, feasibility, implementability and disincentive effects. 
Throughout, the paper highlights the analytical strength of Ramsey tax rules and their importance 
and relevance in designing fiscal policy. In addition, in pursuit of achieving its key objective, the 
paper contests the commonly held criticisms of Ramsey tax rules.  
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The quest for establishing policy relevance of Ramsey tax rules essentially begins with a general 
(but strong) proposition: the aim of optimal tax analysis is to describe the taxes that governments 
should set, and not necessarily to explain the taxes that governments do set. In essence, a close 
relationship between the optimal tax prescriptions and the taxes that are actually implemented 
should not be expected. This is because there are a number of reasons for believing that 
governments do not follow normative approach to policy design and policy implementation. This 
proposition, shared equally by Slemrod (1990) and Heady (1993), however should not inhibit one 
from examining the correspondence between ‘should be’ policy and ‘actual’ policy. This paper 
attempts to shortlist some recent tax reforms in major industrialized economies that have closely, 
if not completely, followed the principle of distortion minimization. It argues that despite the 
widely speculated difficulty associated with mapping normative tax rules into positive policy 
design, it is possible to implement taxes that have strong correspondence to Ramsey tax formulas. 
The paper also attempts to analyze the reasons why some implemented tax rules lack consistency 
with Ramsey principles, or why it is often difficult to establish correspondence between some 
implemented taxes and Ramsey tax rules. While this analysis provides an understanding of the 
difficulty associated with following normative approach to tax reforms, it also identifies the areas 
where research on Ramsey taxation should be extended. 
 
Before proceeding into further details, it becomes, to some extent, necessary to introduce the two 
stylized traditions in the optimal taxation theory, although to my understanding there is barely any 
reason why this classification is strict and important to many2. A research on optimal taxation is 
typically based on any one of the two traditions, namely, the Ramsey tradition due to Frank 
Ramsey (1927), and the Mirrlees tradit ion due to James Mirrlees (1971). Much of the thoughts 
and practice of the Ramsey tradition will be the main discussion to follow in this paper. Ramsey’s 
(1927) original idea is that in an economy with competitive markets, revenue raising second best 
taxes on transactions should be consistent with a set of qualifications: optimal taxes should be 
feasible, implementable, and associated with minimum distortion and disincentive effects.  The 
relatively recent drift in this tradition is to examine the intertemporal equivalents of these 
qualifications, i.e. the optimal intertemporal pattern of distortions from average consumption taxes 
and a set of income taxes. There are three common features of most Ramsey taxation models3: 
each model specifies a given revenue requirement for the government and a fixed set of 
                                                 
2 I think the classification is a mere stylization. Contributions to the literature that follow either of these two 
traditions are of similar importance in designing tax policy. Put differently, and in a rather misanthropist manner, if 
one argues against Ramsey tax rules, similar line of argument applies to the non-Ramsey optimal taxation school 
of thought. A combined set of results accumulated from the two streams is more helpful in understanding the 
policy relevance of optimal tax rules, in general. Given the current paper’s key focus, results from the non-Ramsey 
tradition are regarded as important mainly for a complete assessment of policy relevance of optimal tax rules.  
3 The current archive of papers that follow Ramsey tradition is huge and therefore establishing policy relevance of 
Ramsey tax rules necessitates moderating the subset of models used. The current paper only focuses on Ramsey 
taxation models with representative agent and full commitment (time-consistent) tax policy. I assume this is not an 
abstraction, rather, this is an attempt to establish the importance and policy relevance of tax rules that most closely 
follow Ramsey’s original approach and intuitions. 
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proportionate taxes on transactions, and rule out lump sum taxes due to its impracticality; each 
model specifies how consumers and producers react to a particular tax policy; and each model 
specifies the government’s objective function for evaluating different configurations of taxes. The 
fixed and strictly positive revenue requirement and impracticality of lump sum taxes stand as the 
motivation behind the problem of choosing second best taxes. The government’s purely 
benevolent role through welfare maximization captures the ideas of distortion and disincentive 
effect minimization. The government’s consideration for equilibrium behaviour of taxpayers for 
its chosen tax rates satisfies implementability and feasibility requirements. The Ramsey tradition, 
in general, does not consider the details of the political process that generates tax policy, and does 
not deal with the possibility that policymakers’ objectives may be something other than 
benevolent. The desirability of any tax policy is evaluated solely by its consequences for 
taxpayers. 
 
The Mirrlees tradition, on the other hand, is more absorbed on redistribution issues and utilitarian 
arguments of taxation, which is why its primary focus is on marginal tax rates in an economy 
where agents have heterogeneous types and endowments. In this tradition, the key underlying 
assumption is that the optimal level of income tax depends on the consumer’s ability to earn 
money. If the government had perfect knowledge of this ability, it could levy an ability-dependent 
lump sum tax that would not distort the consumer’s allocation decisions. Due to incomplete 
information about ability, the government can only base the income tax policy on realized income. 
The income tax schedule can be seen as an incentive scheme eliciting information about the 
consumer’s ability. The literature based on this tradition therefore highlights mainly the 
importance and policy relevance of non linear taxation of income. 
 
The substantive lessons of taxation stemming from the two stylized traditions are, from a broad 
perspective, nearly similar. The important difference is perhaps their methodology and focus4. The 
current paper’s objective is to establish the policy relevance of Ramsey tax rules, which is 
accomplished mainly by emphasizing their importance and defending them against their 
criticisms. The key results from the Mirrlees tradition are held as supporting arguments, which 
will be highlighted within the line of discussion. A summary of the key results and modelling 
techniques of the Mirrlees tradition, apart from the pioneering paper by James Mirrlees, can be 
found in Renstrom (1999). 
 
 
                                                 
4 One may observe that some authors are explicitly in favour of one over the other. The reason for such a bias, as 
implied by their papers, is specific to the particular purpose of their papers. The general principles of taxation 
drawn from these two traditions are more or less equivalent. It is, however, important to mention that the recent 
campaigners of fair taxation through progressive taxation in the US are following the line of arguments from the 
Mirrlees tradition, where flat tax plans are severely criticized (see for instance, Shapiro (1996)). On the other hand, 
flat tax campaigners are putting more emphasis on the Ramsey tradition (see for instance, Minford (2006) and 
Bickley (2004)). 
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A Summary of the Discussion. 
 
Review of the critiques suggests that critics typically target the underlying assumptions and 
features of optimal taxation models, and practicality and political acceptability of the optimal tax 
rules. Most critics claim that the simplifying assumptions and some underlying features (e.g. 
ruling out lump sum taxes, abstraction from formal modelling of administrative costs) of standard 
Ramsey tax models are limitations of the theory. This paper argues that the simplifying 
assumptions of optimal taxation models in general (and Ramsey tax models in particular) are 
innocuous, and neces sary, since elaborate attention to such details is relatively less important than 
the broader set of goals of the theory, which their abstraction facilitates to achieve. The features of 
Ramsey tax models that are often under scrutiny are the ones which allegedly fail to 
simultaneously justify fairness and efficiency of a particular Ramsey tax rule. Defining fairness of 
a tax system is not simple, but fairness can be an attractive feature from a political perspective. In 
a way, such an issue is actually addressed in most standard representative agent Ramsey taxation 
models, although with much less emphasis than the critics would like to see. Efficiency of tax 
policy is one of the main focuses of optimal taxation theory, which is reflected in the welfare 
maximization process of finding tax rules that reduce disincentive effects in allocation. Critics 
argue that greater emphasis of efficiency is associated with trading off fairness. Given a particular 
definition of fairness, this trade off problem is likely, and perhaps inevitable, but as will be 
detailed later it is not such a serious problem. 
 
Critics also question the implementability and practicality of Ramsey tax rules. Such arguments 
are generally irrelevant, and this can be verified by simple intuitions. A Ramsey taxation model 
with a representative agent is particularly intended to imitate the fiscal policy design process and 
specify the normative benchmark average levels and composition of taxes. Without further 
specialization and extension of focus, one cannot expect the model to yield instrumental and 
applicable results that specify how such policies can be practically implemented. Moreover, 
Ramsey tax rules in dynamic settings in particular directly infer to the optimal average effective 
tax rates on the taxable transactions, which, in practical policy designing process, can be attained 
with a combination of different tax instruments. Finding the right combination of taxes that 
achieves the optimal policy, or identifying the problems associated with doing so is a different 
issue, and hence should be addressed separately. Ramsey tax rules are therefore more useful and 
insightful from the macroeconomic perspective (the level and composition of tax revenue) than 
the microeconomic perspective (design aspects of specific taxes), implying that criticizing Ramsey 
tax rules on grounds of practicality of tax systems is in fact far from relevant. The more useful and 
important way to think of the Ramsey tax rules is the correspondence between their underlying 
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princip le and tax reforms, i.e. whether or not, or how closely or remotely, a tax reform is 
following the underlying principles of Ramsey tax rules. 
 
Ramsey (1927) argued that the second best tax policy should prescribe tax rates on different 
commodities as linked inversely to their demand elasticity, implying that necessities should be 
taxed heavily as compared to luxuries. This principle is strictly against the norm of uniform 
commodity taxation. The perception that uniform commodity taxation is optimal is quite natural. 
At a first instinct, it is sensible to assume that the lowest efficiency cost will be achieved with the 
fewest distortions in relative prices. Since uniform commodity taxation alters none of the relative 
prices of goods, it is most likely to be the optimal policy. But Ramsey (1927) shows that uniform 
commodity taxation is optimal only for preferences that are homothetic and separable over a 
number of goods . Equal tax rate on all goods except leisure increases the relative price of all 
goods as compared to leisure which results in an inefficiently large consumption of leisure. This is 
associated with serious efficiency loss due to suboptimal working hours, and therefore uniform 
commodity tax rates cannot be optimal. Ramsey argues that the optimal policy should tax 
complements of leisure heavily and substitutes of leisure lightly, i.e. income taxes should be low 
while general consumption taxes should be high in order to minimize the aggregate level of tax 
distortions and disincentive effects. Thus, underlying Ramsey’s inverse elasticity rule for 
commodity taxation is the Ramsey principle: the second best tax system is one that damages 
everyone’s incentives to work and save as little as possible. 
 
In practice, however, uniform tax principle has led the recent policy reforms. The uniform 
commodity tax policy has been implemented through the introduction of VAT or GST type 
commodity taxation schemes. This reform agenda is primarily based on minimizing administrative 
costs of taxation, which I will focus in some detail later. In addition, this reform agenda often uses 
a reinterpretation of the Ramsey principle in favour of uniform taxation. The reinterpretation is 
mainly in favour of maintaining tax neutrality in tax reforms. Since raising tax rates reduces 
output, the loss of output is more and more damaging because of the increasing loss of value to the 
economy, in terms of effort being expended in pursuit of increasing real income to buy heavily 
taxed goods. By contrast, lowering tax rates to increase output is associated with smaller gains 
from that higher output because the extra value gets closer to the extra cost of the reform. If one 
assumes that output responsiveness is same across different markets, tax rates should be equalized; 
because there is no gain from switching the tax burden from, say, one commodity to another (see 
for instance, Minford (2006)). This intuition applies equivalently against setting differential 
income taxes (across sectors, say). Understandably, underlying this intuition for uniform 
commodity taxes there is a quest for managing a simple tax structure and creating uniform 
distortions in relative prices. 
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The quest for simplistic tax administration or the conception of tax neutrality should not be 
mistaken as a strong ground of criticizing Ramsey’s inverse elasticity rule. The fact is that 
Ramsey’s inverse elasticity rule is better viewed as a principle rather than a formula. The Ramsey 
principle says that taxes should be uniform for a set of commodities for which preferences are 
homothetic and separable, i.e. a set of commodities with similar elasticity of demand. The inverse 
elasticity rule particularly says that anything that encourages leisure (e.g. consumption) should be 
taxed heavily, and anything that encourages work (e.g. income or savings) should be taxed lightly. 
This is a broad reason why even with VAT or GST type schemes, Ramsey’s inverse elasticity rule 
has not totally perished from practical policy designs. There is always a set of commodities (some 
of which may be bads and not goods) which does not fall under the regular VAT or GST category, 
and are taxed relatively lightly or heavily as compared to the remaining set of commodities. A 
higher than VAT or GST rate tax on inelastically demanded cigarettes, for instance, is an efficient 
policy due to many reasons. First, it is associated with reduced smoking due to price incentive. 
Although a large number of smokers tend to act insensitively to the rise in cigarette prices, a high 
tax on cigarette purchase is likely to discourage smoking amongst middle and low income groups, 
or amongst the new generation of smokers, or amongst smokers who are in search of a good 
enough reason to quit. This is associated with improving living conditions, environment and 
general health. In addition, due to the demand inelasticity of cigarettes, a higher tax on cig arettes 
generates extra revenue which can be used to reduce healthcare costs, say. In the current UK tax 
policy, for instance, the VAT is 17.5% but the effective tax rate on cigarettes is 22% of the retail 
price plus a duty of £105.10 per thousand cigarettes, which makes each packet of 20 cigarettes 
cost an additional 9 pence as compared to 2005. A zero VAT rate applies to food, books, 
newspapers, magazines, children’s clothes and other special exempt items. 
 
Ramsey’s idea of designing optimal taxes with minimum disincentive effects and minimum 
distortions is reminiscent of the relatively recent idea of designing optimal taxes that create 
smooth intertemporal wedges in allocations. Optimal income taxes should correspond to smooth 
tax distortions over time, implying that the income tax-induced wedge between marginal rate of 
substitution of consumption and marginal rate of transformation of consumption across different 
dates should be uniform over time. This intuition is central to one of the most important 
contributions of dynamic optimal taxation theory: its lessons for capital tax policy, which is 
largely due to three influential papers by Kenneth Judd (1985), Christophe Chamley (1986) and 
Larry Jones, Rodolfo Manuelli & Peter Rossi (1997). The key result of these papers is that the 
second best policy involves zero tax on (physical and human) capital, and smooth and roughly 
constant labor tax and consumption tax in order to finance revenues. The growth and welfare 
prospects and the strong underlying intuition of these principles make them more or less 
irrefutable and laudable in modern tax reform proposals, which is why one observes the trend of 
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cutting down marginal tax rates on capital income in recent OECD economies’ tax reforms. This 
can be verified from the OECD Revenue Statistics and various issues of OECD Observer. 
 
The pursuit for developing dynamic Ramsey tax rules has motivated important papers that address 
the issue of optimal income tax policy in imperfectly competitive economies. The principle of 
differential taxes on income and commodities, due to Stiglitz & Dasgupta (1971), and tax 
favoured treatment to intermediate goods, due to Diamond & Mirrlees (1971), motivated Judd 
(1997) in an attempt to reincarnate the Investment Tax Credit (ITC) scheme of the US tax code by 
establishing that optimal capital tax should be negative. Later, Guo & Lansing (1999) show that 
with monopoly profits flowing as a fixed income to households, the government has a strong 
motivation to discourage profit-seeking investment by taxing capital. Although these two results 
are complementing, there is an ambiguity surrounded over the equivalence and analytical strength 
of the two results, i.e. one needs to identify which principle is robust, and can be held as a 
representative guide towards designing a practical capital tax policy. Essentially, implementing a 
capital subsidy policy is actually far from simple since it requires a sequence of windfall taxes to 
completely confiscate profits. In an imperfectly competitive economy, there is a strong motivation 
to tax capital in order to discourage profit-seeking investment, which is more likely to be relevant 
to practical policy design. 
 
If there is a criticism that characterizes a limitation of the Ramsey tradition to optimal taxation, it 
is the one which weakens the usefulness of standard Ramsey tax rules in designing tax policy in 
developing countries. Optimal taxation in developing countries is essentially a futuristic research. 
It has been attempted very recently in Penalosa & Turnovsky (2004). An economic model that 
explores fiscal policy in developing countries requires particular attention to some special 
features, which are not typically included in standard economic models. These may be 
predominance of informal sector activities which makes it difficult to identify taxable income and 
calculate taxable base, commercial integration which makes the feasible margin of deviating tax 
policy from other countries’ tax policy very restricted, and issues related to tax administration and 
collection. Given such unconventional features and the complexity of addressing them in standard 
models, tax policy in developing countries remains as the art of the possible rather than the pursuit 
of the optimal. It is not surprising that optimal taxation theory, as it has been practiced, will have 
relatively little impact on the design of tax systems in these countries. This paper includes a 
particular section that discusses, rather briefly, the findings of Penalosa & Turnovsky (2004) and 
highlights the extent to which the Ramsey principles can be mapped into such an unconventional 
tax policy design problem. 
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Optimality. 
 
The optimality criterion of Ramsey tax rules has been through rigorous investigations, mostly on 
grounds of fairness, feasibility of collection and compliance, and disincentive effects. Important 
papers that belong to this practice are those of Shavell (1981), Slemrod (1990), Mayshar (1991), 
Heady (1993), Alm (1996) and Shapiro (1996). All these authors agree that the abstraction from 
formally modelling the costs associated with tax collection and tax compliance significantly 
weakens the optimality and policy relevance of optimal tax rules. More precisely, these authors 
argue that the second best tax policy ceases to be consistent with the theory of second best because 
of its abstraction from the cost of administering and implementing such a policy. Their views, 
however, differ in characterizing the fairness of a tax system, and thus the criticism of optimal tax 
rules on fairness ground remains more or less unclear. 
 
Technically, Ramsey tax rules’ optimality is rather simple and clear. Due to the impracticality 
associated with implementing lump sum taxes, which combined with a first best tax policy would 
otherwise replicate socially optimal allocations, a welfare maximizing Ramsey tax in competitive 
setting must be the second best policy and the associated allocations and prices must be the second 
best allocations and prices. This section first presents the general representation of this 
proposition. Mapping the second best taxes into practical tax policy design, allegedly, is far from 
simple. According to Heady (1993), for a tax policy to be politically desirable and implementable, 
the set of criteria other than simple utility maximization the policy must satisfy includes (a) 
fairness; (b) economy in collection and compliance; and (c) minimum disincentive effects. This 
section also analyzes to what extent the standard second best Ramsey plans satisfy these additional 
considerations. 
 
That the Ramsey tax rules under commitment are in general the second best outcomes can be 
verified by considering a general representation of the Ramsey problem with commitment in an 
economy with competitive markets. Consider a simple one period economy where government is 
committed to run its announced policy and has a technology that permits it to choose an action 
first, i.e. ahead of the private sector. There is a continuum of households, each of whom chooses 
an action XÎe , in response to the government’s choice of an action YÎg . Both X and Y are 
sequentially compact sets, i.e. the sequence of elements of X  and Y  have convergent 
subsequence whose limits lie in X  and Y , respectively. The average level of e  across 
households is denoted by XÎe . When the government chooses g , and given that the average 
level of households’ action is e , a particular household chooses e  which gives utility 
),,u( gee . Assume that the preferences are strictly monotone in e , and the utility function is 
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strictly concave and continuously differentiable. For realized levels of g  and e , the 
representative household faces the following problem: 
 
),,u(max geee XÎ         (1) 
 
The solution to (1) is a function denoted by ),( geee = . With the commitment assumption, the 
representative household acts to set its equilibrium response ),( geee =  for the government’s 
action g , and for the belief that the average level of other households’ actions is set at e . 
Furthermore, if one assumes that all households are identical, then actual level of e  is ),( gee . 
For expectations about the average to be consistent with the average outcome, one would require 
ee = , or simply, ),( geee = . A Competitive Equilibrium in this setting is an action XÎe  
that is consistent with ),( geee = . A competitive equilibrium that satisfies 
),,u(max),,u( geegee e XÎ=  is generated by an action YÎg  of the government. For each 
chosen action of the government, YÎg , let )(gxe =  denote the corresponding competitive 
equilibrium. The set of competitive equilibria is therefore defined as )}(),({ gxege ==E .  
 
The Ramsey problem for the government is ]),(),([umax ggxgxg YÎ , or equivalently, 
],,[umax ),( geege EÎ . Let Y
R Îg  denote the policy that attains the maximum of the Ramsey 
problem. The Ramsey plan is ),( RR eg  where )( RR gxe = . The Ramsey plan in this setting is 
a result of the following sequence of actions. First, the government chooses YÎg . Knowing the 
setting of g , the households respond with XÎe , such that ),( geee = . The government is 
benevolent, i.e. it evaluates its set of policies YÎg  on the basis of welfare maximizing motive. 
More specifically, the government chooses a particular policy YÎg  that (a) maximizes 
),,u( gee , and (b) is consistent with the government’s correctly foreseen equilibrium reaction of 
households, )(gxe = . By contrast, a benevolent dictator would simply choose a pair of actions 
that solves the problem ),,u(max , geege YX ÎÎ . Any such pair ),(
FF eg  replicates the first best 
or socially optimal outcome5. In general such outcomes cannot be reached under a decentralized 
                                                 
5 For instance, if g  represents a complete set of tax instruments on transactions, Fg  is the policy that sets zero 
taxes on all transactions and raises all revenue by a single lump sum tax. For a competitive setting that involves 
intertemporal decision-making, a sequence of fixed revenue requirements can be satisfied by a sequence of fixed 
lump sum taxes and a sequence of zero tax on transactions involving period by period decisions (e.g. labor supply) 
and intertemporal decisions (e.g. capital accumulation). This lump sum tax is fixed for all households irrespective 
of the level of their endowment or income. This policy is associated with no efficiency loss since it does not 
influence the working, consumption or saving decisions of a household. In addition, if there are pre-existing 
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regime. Consider, however, the outcome where the government’s action YÎg  is dictatorial, i.e. 
without any consideration of the equilibrium feedback. Surely the Ramsey plan ))(,( RR gxg  is 
inferior to the dictatorial outcome ),( FF eg , because the restriction EÎ),( eg  is in general 
binding. Moreover, in general )( FF gxe ¹ , so first best outcomes are not Ramsey plans. 
 
More intuitively, the dictatorial outcome in such a setting would imply that the government may 
replicate a first best outcome by choosing YF Îg , if for any XÎe , Fee £ , and the 
government does not take into account the competitive equilibrium reaction ),( FFF geee = . 
As long as the policy YF Îg  is practically implementable, it can be implemented without any 
consideration of ),( FFF geee = . Since preferences are strictly monotone and Fee £  for any 
XÎe , the policy YF Îg  does not distort welfare through its effect on households’ equilibrium 
decision, implying that it would attain first best optimality, i.e. ),,u(),,u( geegee ³FFF . On 
the other hand, if the policy YF Îg  is not practically implementable, the government’s next best 
alternative is the Ramsey plan ))(,( RR gxg , which solves ],,[umax ),( geege EÎ . The 
corresponding policy YR Îg  is welfare maximizing, but it induces efficiency loss relative to the 
first best outcome since it distorts the households’ competitive equilibrium allocation decisions. 
The welfare maximizing Ramsey policy is therefore associated with the minimum loss of welfare 
from the ),,u( FFF gee  margin and therefore attains second best optimality. Put in terms of 
notations, since YR Îg   induces FR egx <)( , ),,u(),,u( RFFF geegee > , for YF Îg . 
Thus the Ramsey plan ))(,( RR gxg  attains second best optimality. 
 
 
‘Fairness’ of Second Best Taxes. 
 
What actually is a fair tax policy? Heady (1993, p. 17) wisely asserts that “fairness of a tax policy 
means different things to different people”. Though not due to this one-dimensional reason, the 
critics of optimal taxation theory generally differ in ideological characterization of fairness of a 
tax system or tax policy. This is not surprising, since fairness itself is an obscure feature and its 
characterization requires adhering to proxy features of tax systems such as progressiveness, equity 
                                                                                                                                            
distortion in the economy that pushes private return to factors lower than socially optimal returns, Fg  involves 
corrective subsidies (to push up the private return at the level of optimal return) and a larger-than-government-
revenue lump sum tax to finance the subsidy. 
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and compliance. From a policymaker’s point of view, a fair tax system means a tax system free of 
favouritism or self- interest or bias or deception. This definition is conventional, and perhaps fair. 
Other than this, fairness of a tax system in essence can have different interpretations in different 
groups of taxpayers. In the optimal taxation literature, a fair tax system is typically characterized 
by attaching different weights to horizontal and vertical equity (see for instance, Shapiro (1996) 
for details), minimization of inequality (see for instance, Shavell (1981) for details), and tax 
compliance (see for instance, Alm (1996) for details). The current analysis of fairness is limited to 
the first two concepts, while the issue of tax compliance is deferred to the section analyzing 
administrative costs of taxation. 
 
Most critics, irrespective of their stand on defining fairness, claim that Ramsey tax rules lack 
fairness mainly due to Ramsey tradition’s key emphasis on efficient taxes. There is a trade off 
between efficiency and equity of a tax system, which perhaps is an inherent feature of any tax 
policy6. The broad objective of Ramsey taxation is minimizing inefficiency of taxes, and from a 
macroeconomic perspective establishing the importance of equity of a second best policy is 
somewhat obscure. In the literature involving Ramsey taxation, except for Judd (1985) and 
Ljungqvist & Sargent (2000, ch.12) who use models with heterogeneous agents and lump sum 
transfers, the issue of equity is typically simplified by assuming that all taxpayers are identical in 
tastes and endowment. Renstrom (1999) argues that such simplifications of Ramsey models 
induce a trade off between efficiency and both vertical and horizontal equity, and greater emphasis 
of efficiency and abstraction from equity limits its policy practicality. As is clear by now, the trade 
off argument is somewhat undeniable. The issue is therefore the cost of this trade off, or more 
precisely, the opportunity cost of emphasizing efficiency. The efficiency-equity trade off debate 
can be partly resolved if one considers the relative importance of these two rather abstract 
principles. Consider for instance the issue of vertical equity. A tax policy is fair in terms of 
vertical equity if the tax burden is consistent across taxpayers of different means. This is the 
typical focus of the Mirrlees (1971) tradition of optimal taxation. A standard Mirrlees-type 
approach with heterogeneously endowed agents essentially finds that the resulting optimal non-
linear tax rules are consistent with vertical equity, and thus one might argue that these rules are 
fair tax rules. This intuition is conceivable, but commodity taxes which vary with the 
circumstances of the buyer are in general impractical. 
                                                 
6 A first best policy which involves zero taxes on transactions and a lump sum tax, for instance, is the most 
efficient tax policy since it is associated with minimum disincentive effects. But such a first best policy is the least 
fair tax policy unless taxpayers are identical and have identical endowments. To illustrate this idea further, 
consider a hypothetical situation where the taxation authority seeks to raise a given amount of revenue to finance 
local government expenditure, and has the option to implement a flat community charge or a proportionate local 
income tax. In choosing between the two, most taxpayers would regard the local income tax as fairer. But a local 
income tax would have a greater disincentive effect on labor supply than the community charge. In order to choose 
a policy, it is therefore necessary for the authority to weigh the fairness advantage of the local income tax against 
its disadvantage of discouraging work. The main theme of optimal taxation theory is to create welfare maximizing 
tax policy which has minimum disincentive effect on allocations. In this sense, the fairness advantage of local 
income tax is likely to be out-weighed.  
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Ramsey’s inverse elasticity rule states that more inelastically demanded goods tend to attract 
higher tax rates. The efficiency cost minimizing commodity taxes will therefore in general differ 
by commodity. Any tax on transactions involves a loss of consumer surplus. The loss in consumer 
surplus is greater if demand is more elastic, implying that the rise in the price facing a consumer 
from the tax will lead to a larger reduction in quantity purchased than if demand were more 
inelastic . Moreover, if all goods except leisure are taxed at the same rate, a reduced relative price 
of leisure leads to an inefficiently large consumption of leisure. The optimal tax pattern should 
take advantage of commodities’ relative substitutability and complementarity with leisure. A 
complement to leisure should be taxed relatively heavily, and a substitute for leisure should be 
taxed relatively lightly. Given this intuition, in principle, the issue of equity ceases to be of major 
importance here. The concern of efficiency is one of major importance, since welfare maximizing 
(but distorting) taxes should reflect the advantages of incentive effects more than the advantages 
of fairness. Too much attention to equity may be associated with allowing for too much 
inefficiency, resulting in too much distortion in intertemporal allocations.  
 
An alternative (and perhaps more practical) view of fairness is associated with inequality, which 
in turns is related to social welfare. In Ramsey tax models, social welfare is seen as an indicator of 
well being of society and is taken to depend on the utilities of individuals. In its simplest setting, 
social welfare is defined by the utility of the measure one of households. Social welfare can also 
depend on how equally these utilities are distributed as long as agents differ in endowments. In the 
utilitarian school of thought it is typically assumed that social welfare decreases as inequality 
increases. In this way, the concept of social welfare captures one idea of fairness of a tax system. 
Taxes are fair if they reduce the degree of inequality, implying that attempt to maximize welfare 
will involve an instantaneous attempt to achieve fairness. Given this idea, the social welfare 
function must place more weight on utility gains of poor people than those of rich people, which is 
one of the main motivations of the heterogeneous agent redistributive taxation models typically 
used in the Mirrlees tradition. However, this does not imply that it is strictly necessary to follow 
the Mirrlees methodology to derive such insights. Judd (1985) and Ljungqvist & Sargent (2000, 
ch. 12) show that a Ramsey model with heterogeneous agents and optimal redistributive taxation 
can actually recover the key findings of the optimal redistributive taxation that follow the Mirrlees 
tradition, and that, perhaps at a relatively lower cost of methodology.  
 
The real-world campaign for fair tax systems is an interesting move that is observed mainly in 
major industrialized economies. Establishing that the key manifesto of these campaigns is based 
primarily on Ramsey rules is not difficult. The concept of a fair tax in the US is one of a single-
rate, federal sales tax collected only once, at the final point of purchase of new goods and services 
for personal consumption. If implemented, as the campaign demands, it replaces federal income 
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taxes including, personal, estate, gift, capital gains, alternative minimum, social security, 
medicare, self-employment, and corporate taxes. The US concept of fair tax, therefore, imposes a 
single rate tax for all buyers independent of the level of their wealth. Since buyers with higher 
wealth spend more money than other individuals, the amount of tax that they pay will be more 
than other individuals. On the other hand, the idea that every household receives a rebate that is 
equal to the fair tax paid on essential goods and services claims that the policy is fair to middle 
and low income groups. Relatively elastic goods and activities, such as financing research and 
development, donations to charities, employment generation, are tax favoured. Since the relatively 
wealthier individuals are likely to spend on these activities, they will spend more in order to 
reduce their tax burden on consumption expenditure. More spending on these activities will foster 
growth and welfare for the middle and low income groups. 
 
In the UK, the concept of a fair tax is interpreted through the campaign of a flat tax system. This 
campaign actually originated from the campaign of implementing a flat (irrespective of locality) 
council tax rate. In its pure version, a flat tax replaces multiple marginal tax rates with a single 
marginal tax rate, and abolishes the complex systems of allowances and tax relief. Under the flat 
tax principle personal allowances are unjustifiable because they imply a rise in the necessary flat 
rate of tax. In addition, the campaign demands lower generosity in providing tax credits and 
benefits, because these welfare tools, though worthy of their own purposes, are expensive in taxes 
which drags down the welfare and efficiency of the general taxpayer. All taxes, corporate, 
personal income, and VAT, are set at the same rate, amounting in effect to a consumption tax 
which abolishes any double taxation (e.g. taxation of dividends). The advantages of a flat tax are 
its simplicity and transparency, leading to faster economic growth due to greater incentives to 
work, and the removal of various disincentives and distortions caused by existing tax distortions, 
including the creation of large black markets through tax avoidance and evasion. These 
advantages have been apparent in the many East European countries including Russia, Estonia, 
Latvia, Ukraine, Georgia and Romania, which, whilst moving from the plan to the market, have 
adopted flat taxes. The prime feature of both the US fair tax campaign and UK flat tax campaigns 
is creating a simple, distortion minimizing and welfare improving redistributive tax system, all of 
which are essential characteristics of Ramsey tax rules. 
 
 
Administrative and Compliance Costs. 
 
Perhaps the most severe criticism of the optimal taxation theory stems from its moderate attention 
to the details of administrative and compliance costs of taxation. A compelling survey of such 
criticisms can be found in Alm (1996). Administrative and compliance costs are actually 
important issues from the perspective of design and implementation of specific taxes. However, 
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they are not so important if one is only concerned about the average level and composition of 
taxes. In representative models of Ramsey taxation that deal specifically with the average level of 
taxes, minimizing administrative costs will be reflected in social welfare, because higher 
administrative costs will require a greater amount of gross revenue to be collected that reduces 
individual utilities. Modelling administration costs formally in Ramsey taxation is therefore not 
apparently appealing. 
 
Nevertheless, there have been attempts to formally include administrative costs in optimal taxation 
models. To my knowledge the seminal attempt is of Yitzhaki’s (1979), which presents a simple 
static model of optimal commodity taxation with administrative costs where the aim of the 
taxation authority is to minimize the social cost of taxation7. According to his specification, the 
social cost of taxation is the sum of the administrative cost and the deadweight loss caused by the 
tax system. By varying the number of feasible tax rates, Yitzhaki (1979) finds that the relative 
effect of administrative costs worsens the optimality of the second best policy. This is why one of 
his conclusions was that if one allows the number of feasible taxes to vary, the optimal taxation 
problem with cost of collecting taxes ceases to be a problem in the theory of the second best. 
While his assumption of varying tax instruments is tempting, it is not consistent with second best 
taxation theory. Obviously, if one allows the number of taxes to vary to account for variable 
government expenditures, the second best optimality of Ramsey policy is in question even without 
explicit modelling of administrative costs. Varying government expenditure essentially relates to a 
trivial solution, i.e. set government expenditure equal to zero and do not use distorting taxes. On 
the other hand, with strictly positive government expenditure if one allows the number of tax 
instruments to vary, a trivial solution may be to eliminate all distorting taxes, or set all distorting 
taxes equal to zero, and use a lump sum tax equivalent to raise the required revenue. This 
particular solution is likely to replicate first best allocations, but as agreed by many, large lump 
sum taxes lack practicality. 
 
Even if one relies on Yitzhaki’s (1979) interpretation that administrative and compliance costs of 
taxation is a proportion of the social cost of taxation, it is difficult to find a good enough reason to 
model it formally. A shadow measure of the social cost of taxation can be captured from the 
deviation of second best welfare from the first best welfare. An implementable set of distorting 
taxes induces a deviation from competitive equilibrium welfare which is essentially captured in 
the planner’s programming problem. More precisely, the planner’s welfare maximizing problem 
involves, in addition to the resource constraint, a constraint that restricts welfare maximizing taxes 
to be implementable. This means that the Ramsey planner can choose taxes that generate a set of 
equilibrium allocations (and prices) that is purely consistent with taxpayers’ equilibrium 
                                                 
7 A relatively more recent attempt to model administrative costs in optimal taxation model can be found in 
Mayshar (1991), which derives the conditions that characterize the optimal use of the tax assuming that there are 
costs to both the taxpayer and the government from collecting a generic form of taxes. 
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allocations (and prices). This added restriction in the planner’s problem is associated with a 
present value cost of a sequence of tax plans, i.e. the discounted social cost of administering the 
distorting tax policy. This social cost of taxes therefore is representative of administrative costs of 
taxes. To see the matter more formally, consider for instance, a very standard one sector 
neoclassical growth model of Ramsey taxation, more in the spirit of Ljungqvist & Sargent (2000, 
ch. 12). The final good )( ty  is produced using labor )( tn  and capital )( tk  as inputs and is 
traded in competitive market. The resource constraint is: 
 
011 =-+--- + tttttt kkgcnkF )(),( d      (2) 
 
where  private consumption, government consumption and investment are denoted by tc , tg  and 
ti , respectively. ++ ® RR:
2F  exhibits constant returns to scale, is continuously differentiable, 
strictly increasing, strictly concave in both arguments, and satisfies ¥=® )(Flim tkk t 0  and 
0=¥® )(Flim tkk t  for any 0>n . The government’s period t  budget constraint is 
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beginning of period t , and tq  and tt  denotes capital and labor tax rates, respectively. 
Competitive pricing ensures that equilibrium factor prices equate their marginal products. The 
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The utility function is standard. Given tg , the government chooses tax rates to maximize welfare 
such that these taxes are feasible and implementable, i.e. the allocations and prices generated by 
these welfare maximizing taxes satisfy (2) and the competitive equilibrium. Put differently, the 
government’s welfare maximizing taxes should generate a set of allocations and prices which is 
one element in the set of possible competitive equilibria generated by different tax rate 
combinations. One can thus characterize the Ramsey planner’s problem as one of choosing 
allocations to maximize utility subject to (2) and the following implementability constraint: 
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which is derived by using competitive equilibrium conditions to substitute out prices and taxes 
from household’s wealth constraint. In order to solve this problem, one can conveniently define a 
Pseudo-type utility function, or more intuitively, a second best welfare function: 
 
])()(F [),(F ),,( tntctttt ntuctuncuncV ++º     (5) 
 
where 0³F  is the Lagrange multiplier on (4). Intuitively, F  provides a shadow measure of the 
utility cost of raising government revenues through distorting taxation. Given the Ramsey 
programming problem, say (.)*V  is the maximum value of (.)V . Thus 
][(.)(.) ****** nucuuV nc +F+= , i.e. the second best level of welfare, is equal to first best level of 
welfare less the loss in welfare due to distorting taxes. The loss in welfare is measured in terms of 
loss in allocations due to competitive equilibrium reaction of taxpayers, which is multiplied by the 
shadow price of taxes F . This multiplier’s value is representative of the amount in terms of 
consumption taxpayers are willing pay in order to replace a unit of distorting tax with a unit of 
lump sum tax. If one assumes that lump sum taxes are less costly to administer, the utility cost of 
distorting taxes actually represents a broader measure of administrative costs of taxation. For 
instance if the value of this multiplier is high, the social cost of distorting taxes is high but that of 
lump sum taxes are low, implying that administering the second best tax policy costs relatively 
higher amounts of forgone consumption. Representative Ramsey taxation models thus simplify the 
social cost of taxation with one multiplier, and this formulation is very standard in both static and 
dynamic Ramsey taxation frameworks. Moreover, it is well-known that in an imperfectly 
competitive economy optimal taxes can be very effective in neutralizing monopoly distortions. 
This is the reason why the value of this multiplier is likely to be smaller with imperfectly 
competitive markets and relatively larger with competitive market, implying that in terms of 
forgone consumption, administering a second best tax policy is relatively less costly in economies 
with lesser amount of competition. 
 
In the real world, administering and collecting taxes can be overwhelmingly costly. Interesting 
evidence of such costs is provided by Slemrod (1990) and Alm (1996). For instance in the US, 
operating the tax system requires the participation of over 100 million taxpayers, hundreds of 
thousands of tax professionals, and a multi-billion dollar budget for the Internal Revenue Service 
and its state subsidiaries. Apart from such direct costs, there are costs of tax compliance, tax 
evasion and creating the ease of administering taxes. Alm (1996) reports that for the US economy 
the budget cost of collecting individual income, business income, and sales tax is generally in 
excess of 1% of the revenues from these taxes. The approximate average compliance cost of 
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personal and corporate income taxes for the US economy range from 3% to 7% of their revenue, 
while for UK and Australia these figures range from 2% to 24% of revenues for selected taxes.  
 
In addition, there are discrete changes in compliance costs for any budgetary reforms of tax rates, 
tax relief, or allowances. This makes the design of tax reforms more complicated. It is, however, 
very likely that a tax reform aimed at minimizing distortions by simplifying the collection and 
administration of a tax will lower the compliance costs of that particular tax. To see this more 
clearly, consider the 2006 budgetary reform of the UK government that replaces the Non 
Corporate Distribution Rate (NCDR) and the starting rate of corporation tax with a single small 
companies’ rate. Prior to this reform, the 2004 budget introduced a 19% NCDR to ensure the 
incentive was focused on profits retained by small companies. This NCDR was charged on any 
profits distributed as dividend payments to individuals, rather than retained in the company to 
fund investment8. The Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) for the NCDR published in April 
2004 estimated only a modest increase on the then existing compliance costs for small companies. 
However, the recent RIA indicates that the compliance costs related to implementation of the 
NCDR were significantly  greater than originally estimated. This is because compliance cost of 
discrete reforms requires a company to calculate the corporation tax which would be due if the 
NCDR did not exist, and thus establish the underlying rate of tax. In addition, the company has to 
establish the amount distributed through dividends to persons  other than companies, apply the 
NCDR rate to that amount of non corporate dividend, and apply an underlying rate to the balance 
of taxable profits. The partial RIA of 2005 estimated these compliance costs to be in the region of 
£35 million per year. The most recent RIA revised the figure on the number of companies affected 
by the NCDR and the recent change of NCDR into a small companies’ rate. This revision suggests 
that the compliance costs are £23 million per year, assuming the total compliance time for a 
company to be 1.5 hours and that their time costs £50 per hour. 
 
In general, there is little information on how these costs vary with various tax instruments and tax 
bases. It may be that administrative costs vary in large and discrete amounts with the scale of 
collections, or with the particular transaction which is taxed, or variations in tax instruments that 
necessarily includes variations in tax relief. These hypotheses are roughly similar to Yitzhaki’s 
(1979) one of discontinuous administrative costs for changes in tax base. This is more likely to be 
the main reason why most parts of optimal taxation literature abstracts from modelling these costs 
formally. Administrative and compliance costs of taxation do not vary continuously with taxes, 
but they tend to vary with such things as the number of different rates of tax or the number of tax 
                                                 
8 The starting rate of corporation tax was introduced in 2000 and reduced from 10% to 0% in 2002. It applied to 
companies with profits up to £10,000 per year, with marginal relief for companies with profits between £10,000 
and £50,000 per year. Above this level, profits were taxed at the small companies’ rate of 19% (up to a threshold 
of £300,000). After the reduction of the starting rate to 0%, concerns were raised that the benefits of the rate were 
being used by incorporations not intending to grow. Therefore, at Budget 2004 the NCDR was introduced to 
ensure the incentive was focused on profits retained by small companies. The NCDR charged 19% on any profits 
distributed as dividend payments to individuals, rather than retained in the company to fund investment. 
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allowances. This makes them difficult to include in the mathematical analysis of general 
equilibrium models, and if somehow incorporated, these additional details are likely to inhibit the 
smooth tractability of the relatively more important results. 
 
 
(Dis) incentive Effects. 
 
It is a simple understanding that paying a higher tax bill is not possible without reducing 
consumption, increasing income, reducing savings or increasing borrowing. Tax reforms, such as 
changing marginal tax rates or personal allowances can affect a number of relative prices, which 
in turns affect behavioural choice, resource allocation, and real economic activity. In particular, 
tax-induced relative price changes affect choices between work and leisure, consumption and 
future consumption, and taxable and non-taxable activity. In representative agent frameworks, 
optimal taxation theory formalizes these responses to taxation in a manner that is consistent with 
the specification of utility and intertemporal allocation decisions. 
 
Modelling disincentive effects in a standard optimal taxation framework is likely to be selective, 
however. This is the standard practice, and there are strong reasons, such as tractability, for doing 
so. For instance, income taxation can have significant effects on decisions other than labor supply, 
which may be savings decision, consumption plans and human capital formation (e.g. educational 
choice). Most standard Ramsey models look at these disincentive effects either in conjunction 
with labor supply or separately, but to my knowledge there is no model that attempts to combine 
them all. This is because the imminent complexity associated with such models would be too 
substantial to yield any clear insights.  
 
Selective modelling of disincentive effects however does not limit the usefulness of Ramsey tax 
rules in explaining the incentive structure underlying a policy. The intuition, once again, stems 
from characterizing the mapping of aggregate levels of optimal taxes into specific tax instruments. 
To explain this intuition, consider first that the Ramsey tradition of optimal taxation assumes an 
exogenous level of government expenditure and a fixed set of feasible tax instruments. The 
assumption of a preset (and nonzero) revenue target in obviously essential, for otherwise distortion 
minimizing taxes could just be reduced to zero. This implies that solution to the optimal taxation 
problem will depend on the size of the revenue requirement, and more importantly, any changes in 
taxes should be revenue-neutral. Now consider a hypothetical tax reform of a wage tax cut. A first 
instinct from microeconomics is demarcating the effects of a tax cut into income and substitution 
effects. The income effect of the tax cut is that it increases after-tax income which in turns 
increases the taxpayers’ time allocation to leisure in pursuit of enjoying increased consumption. 
On the other hand, the substitution effect of the tax cut is that marginal return to work becomes 
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high which encourages more work. The net incentive effect of the tax cut, in principle, could go 
either way, depending on the relative strengths of the income and substitution effects. With 
revenue-neutral taxation, however, the average taxpayer’s income effect is embedded in the loss 
or gain of welfare through fall or rise in consumption. Only the substitution effect will operate in 
factor allocations, implying that the tax cut will increase total labor supply. 
 
If the wage tax is the only tax instrument, modelling disincentive effect is therefore simple. With 
multiple taxes, being selective in disincentive effects is actually necessary for trac tability. To 
illustrate it further, consider the same example, now with a broader set of taxes that include capital 
tax and consumption tax. With revenue-neutral taxation, a wage tax cut financed by an 
instantaneous increase in the capital tax rate, for instance, will induce increased labor supply due 
to the substitution effect. But in this case the effect on consumption vis a vis welfare becomes 
ambiguous. Higher capital tax reduces savings, which adversely affects intertemporal 
consumption decision. A cut in wage tax at tandem on the other hand provides higher disposable 
income for consumption. Unless one is able to numerically characterize the welfare effect, it is 
analytically inconclusive which effect dominates. 
 
It is widely accepted that tax reforms should be guided by the motivation to improve economic 
efficiency, i.e. the net incentive effect of a tax reform should be positive. This motivation is 
desirable from both normative and positive viewpoints. This is the central underlying principle of 
second best taxes. However, not all tax reforms can be straightforwardly interpreted as efficiency 
enhancing. First of all, for most general taxpayers it is not simple to identify a cut in average tax 
rate from a tax reform, unless the taxation authority cuts marginal tax rate keeping everything else 
unchanged. Income tax reforms, particularly in the UK, generally implement a number changes in 
different tax instruments including personal allowances, national insurance contributions, tax 
bands, tax credits etc. keeping the marginal tax rate unchanged. Allegedly, these reforms are 
directed towards enhancing growth and welfare by increasing real income and consumption. In 
other words these changes are expected to lower the average effective labor tax rate and increase 
disposable income and consumption. But then, in practice it is not straightforward to make clear 
that a tax reform implementing a tax cut is actually inducing real gains in welfare. This is because 
there are other taxes on transactions, such as consumption and capital taxes, and one needs to 
consider the changes in those taxes in order to evaluate the net incentive effect of a tax reform. 
This is where one starts worrying about the net price effect due to a tax reform, i.e. the relative 
strengths of income and substitution effects due to a tax reform. 
 
Measuring the real net incentive effect of a tax reform is therefore complicated. The 2006 UK 
budget, for instance, implements a higher personal allowance on income tax, a higher tax base 
limit for income tax and higher levels of tax credits, but at tandem increases the national insurance 
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contributions, inheritance tax threshold and job seekers’ allowance. The implemented increase in 
personal allowance ranges from £140 to £200 depending on age. The budget also implements an 
increase in the income tax starting rate (10%) limit from £2,090 to £2,150 and the basic rate (22%) 
limit from £32,400 to £33,000. This is accompanied by a simplified pension tax regime which 
removes the pension scheme earning cap. In order to index for inflation, national insurance 
contributions are to increase within a range of £2 to £15 per week. This is accompanied by 
increases in the working and child tax credits within a range of £20 to £75 per year, increase in job 
seekers’ allowance and a £10,000 higher threshold for inheritance tax. The combined effect of 
these reforms, as reported in the budget 2006 RIA, is essentially a cut in effective labor tax rate 
and a consequent increase in all levels of disposable income. The rate at which lower disposable 
income levels (with gross income up to £20,000 per year) is expected to grow ranges between 
0.3% to 2.7% per year relative to previous levels of disposable income, while for higher levels of 
income this expected growth rate ranges between 0.2% to 0.4%.  
 
If for instance, one assumes that this reform is revenue neutral, the net incentive effect of this 
reform is likely to encourage more work and higher disposable income. Since general 
consumption taxes are more or less unchanged, as long as inflation is within target this reform is 
also likely to encourage more consumption. This is true even if one relaxes the assumption of 
revenue neutral taxation and allows for a distinct income effect of this tax cut. This analysis is 
based on intuitions from simple public economic theory, and given the RIA computations such a 
reform is consistent with Ramsey principles. Now, in addition to this reform in labor tax, consider 
replacing the 0% starting rate of corporation profit tax and the starting marginal relief of 
corporation profit tax by a single 19% small companies’ profit tax for all companies with reported 
profit of £0-£300,000. This simplification allegedly allows small companies to focus on growing 
their businesses, increasing (and investing) their profits by reducing their administrative burden, 
and providing innovations and efficiency gains of their own. In turns, this simplification is likely 
to present a strong competitive challenge to incumbent firms who are in turn prompted to improve 
productivity.  
 
But this reform would also mean that companies with profits of less than £50,000 per year could  
have a tax increase, depending on their current profit distribution policy. With this reform in 
corporation tax policy, the tax incentive to retain profits or making non corporate distributions 
would be removed; implying that small investors, or small family run businesses, or companies 
with sole traders or small partnerships, with under £10,000 profits who do not make distributions 
would incur an increase in capital tax rate from 0% to 19%. In addition to these reforms capital 
gains tax annual exempt amount has been increased in line with statutory indexation and first year 
capital allowances to small businesses are increased from 40% to 50% for investment in plant and 
machinery. But after all, people pay taxes. Neither the statutory indexation of capital gains tax 
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exempt amount nor the increase in capital allowances is likely to make up for the increase in 
effective capital tax rate at the household level. Although the intention of the reform is to promote 
growth in small businesses by boosting incentives to reinvest profits, an increase in effective 
capital tax rate is likely to reduce household savings and future levels of consumption. Any 
increase in effective capital tax rate is inconsistent with Ramsey principle, and I will discuss this 
inconsistency in some more detail in the next section. The net effect on aggregate consumption 
(and growth) due to the UK 2006 tax reform depends on many details, and tracking it accurately 
from a reduced form model is complicated. This is mainly because of the complexity associated 
with incorporating all tax instruments within the average effective tax schedules in a Ramsey 
taxation model. 
 
I acknowledge that the mapping and tractability justifications are too simplistic relative to the 
importance of identifying accurate measures of incentive effects of tax reforms. These arguments 
are therefore likely to be insufficient to stifle the criticisms based on Ramsey tax rules’ selective 
attention to disincentive effects. A tax reform with significant net disincentive effects will 
necessarily be welfare-worsening, and with selective attention to disincentive effects one runs the 
risk of over-rating a Ramsey policy while some other policy could attain a higher level of welfare. 
Wynne (1997) presents a calibrated version of growth, welfare, and disincentive effects of 
hypothetical tax reforms in the US economy using a simple endogenous growth model. The 
calibration, for instance, suggests that halving the labor tax rate and financing it by an increase in 
the capital tax induces a 17% loss of initial consumption (a welfare loss) and slows the economic 
growth rate from 1.7% to 1.5%. By contrast, a same cut in labor tax financed by an increased 
consumption tax boosts economic growth from 1.7% to 2.8%, and increases welfare by increasing 
initial consumption by a massive 39%. In terms of incentive effects, both policies increase labor 
supply but by different amounts. The capital tax increase causes labor supply to increase by 8%, 
but the consumption tax increase results in a 14% increase in labor supply.  
 
Such results are interesting but they necessarily establish that determining growth and welfare 
effect, which are due to tax induced changes in incentives to work, consume or save, is far from 
simple. A significant part of Stokey & Rebelo’s (1995) paper is devoted to documenting this 
proposition in a purely technical manner, and like many I rate their paper to be one of extreme 
significance in understanding the incentive effects of taxes and how such effects should guide tax 
reform proposals. According to their findings, growth effects of a particular tax policy is highly 
sensitive to, among others, elasticity of intertemporal substitution and long run elasticity of labor 
supply, both of which are closely related to incentive effects of tax reforms through their effect on 
beliefs about changes in the interest rate. Since interest rate governs intertemporal allocation 
decisions, a tax reform that affects the interest rate will have long run incentive effects, and hence 
long run effects in growth and welfare. 
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Capital Tax Policy. 
 
It is a widely accepted hypothesis that capital taxes are bad. In a competitive economy capital tax 
drives a wedge between pre-tax capital rental rates and the intertemporal marginal rate of 
substitution between consumption at different dates. The wedge grows at a compounding rate over 
time which is inconsistent with commodity tax principle (see for instance, Judd (1999 & 2002) 
and Mulligan (2003) for details). It is largely because of this underlying economic intuition 
policymakers and economists unanimously hold the principle that capital should receive tax-
favoured treatment. 
 
Perhaps the most celebrated finding of the dynamic optimal taxation literature is that with 
competitive markets the long run optimal capital tax is equal to zero. Judd (1985) and Chamley 
(1986) are the promoters of this idea, who seminally established that in a standard neoclassical 
competitive growth model where the government’s commitment power is perfect, the Ramsey rule 
is consistent with a long run zero capital tax. With a zero tax in the limit, the optimal capital tax 
policy may be frontloaded, i.e. the optimal policy may involve high taxes on initial capital that 
raise more than the required revenue, and zero taxes thereafter that avoids non-uniform 
distortions. Judd (1999) explains this result for a simple tax on savings, but the intuition applies 
similarly to a tax on the return to capital.  
 
If the before tax interest rate is r , say, and savings (or investment income, in general) is taxed at a 
rate equal to q  between time 0  and t , in units of time 0  good the social cost of one unit of 
consumption at time t  is tr -+ )(1 , and the after tax price is tr --+ ))(( q11 . The former 
represents the marginal rate of transformation (MRT) between two dated consumption, while the 
latter is the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between two dated consumption. Equilibrium 
distortions of the tax q  is represented by the ratio of ),( tccMRS 0  and ),( tccMRT 0 , which 
grows exponentially in time creating non-uniform distortions in allocations. The dynamic version 
of the commodity tax principle is that optimal taxes should induce smooth and uniform distortions 
over time. Since the commodity tax equivalent of q  compounds over time, a nonzero level of q  
cannot be optimal9. Ever since its induction, this result has had the privilege of being one of the 
most popular and powerful policy lessons drawn from the Ramsey tradition. A tax reform that 
reduces the average capital tax is convenient (i.e. administratively less costly), more desirable (i.e. 
fairer), efficient (i.e. little or no disincentive effects) and politically acceptable (i.e. 
                                                 
9 If utility is separable across time and between consumption and leisure, and the elasticity of demand for 
consumption does not change over time, the best tax system would have a constant commodity tax equivalent. 
Since a nonzero capital income tax violates this principle, it cannot be optimal. This result is robust in settings with 
heterogeneous agents (see for instance, Judd (1985) for details). 
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implementable). In fact simplifying the capital tax codes and relying less on capital taxation has 
been the trend in OECD tax reforms over the last decade or more. A long run zero capital tax not 
only rules out non-uniform tax distortion but also boosts both short and long run investment10.  
 
The important intuition to consider here is the form of distortions that capital tax creates. If these 
distortions are uniform over time, a capital tax is equivalent to a simple static tax. In a one sector 
growth model where capital is produced at the household level, a capital tax is purely an asset tax 
which creates compounding wedge between marginal rate of substitution and marginal rate of 
transformation of consumption at different dates. This is the underlying intuition of non-optimality 
of a capital tax in such models. For any reason if a capital tax induces uniform distortions, this 
result is not strong, i.e. it may be optimal to use capital tax or subsidy. This idea has been 
proposed recently in Selim (2005). With two production sectors producing consumption goods 
and capital goods, Selim (2005) shows that the long run optimal policy involves zero capital tax in 
capital sector, but nonzero capital tax in consumption sector. Selim (2005), however, leaves the 
sign and magnitude of the nonzero capital tax in consumption sector for further research. The 
important idea of this result is the type of distortion the nonzero capital tax creates. It is optimal to 
set a nonzero capital tax in consumption sector since along the transition to steady state economic 
agents can shift depreciated capital to the sector for which the government has announced zero 
long run tax. This shifting allows agents to avoid compounding tax liabilities associated with 
nonzero capital tax. In the long run, since there is no accumulated old capital stock in consumption 
sector, the distortion created by a nonzero capital tax is analogous to distortion created by a tax on 
any period by period transaction. 
 
With monopoly (or most pre-existing) distortions, the Ramsey rule generally does not prescribe a 
zero capital tax although the tax favoured treatment to capital argument gets a stronger ground. 
Pre-existing distortion like monopoly pricing induces a loss in output and drives a wedge between 
private returns and socially optimal returns to capital and other factors. This implies that tax policy 
may use subsidies to bring buyer price down to social marginal cost. The subsidy result cannot be 
generalized for all transactions, since there is a concern of raising enough revenue to use 
corrective subsidies. The optimal policy therefore must choose some transactions to tax in order to 
subsidize other transactions. Since capital tax induces non-uniform distortions in intertemporal 
allocation decisions, and consumption tax and labor taxes induce uniform distortions, Judd (1997) 
argues that the optimal policy is the one that subsidizes capital and taxes consumption and labor. 
Two years later Guo & Lansing (1999) show that the long run optimal capital tax rate with 
                                                 
10 With less than perfect commitment power policy relevance of this result is weaker. If the government frequently 
changes announced policies, an announcement of zero capital tax in future is not a credible announcement. If the 
government announces the policy and future becomes present when capital has been accumulated, supply of 
capital is inelastic, and the optimal policy becomes the one that taxes it. If the government can change its plan (or 
has a reputation of changing plans), capital owners are perfectly aware of the ex post optimal policy. Thus a zero 
capital tax announced today will not boost investment.   
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imperfectly competitive markets balances underinvestment effect and a profit effect. The 
government is motivated to tax capital since agents may over-invest in search of pure profits. On 
the other hand, due to discouraging private return to capital, there remains a motivation to use 
capital subsidy. Their result suggests that the sign of the optimal capital tax rate is ambiguous, and 
depends on the relative strength of underinvestment effect and profit effect, or more intuitively, on 
the deviation of equilibrium investment from socially optimal level of investment. 
 
The idea behind the optimal capital subsidy result is as follows. With imperfectly competitive 
markets, optimal tax policy must perform a corrective function in addition to their usual revenue-
raising function. The corrective function of taxes can be accomplished by subsidizing some 
transactions while taxing others. The key question remains which to tax and which to subsidize. 
Since mark up on capital goods distort investment just as an asset income tax does, a combination 
of capital tax and capital goods mark up create non-uniform distortions in intertemporal 
allocations. Thus the optimal policy should include taxes on consumption and labor for raising 
enough revenue to finance both government expenditure and capital subsidies. Such capital 
subsidies are often deemed as a costly alternative of other competition enhancing policy options. 
Auerbach & Hines Jr. (2001), for instance, argue that antitrust policy can be more cost effective as 
a policy for enhancing competition and correcting monopoly induced distortions. Antitrust policy 
has intrinsic restrictions of application. Monopoly power in pricing may be attributable to many 
circumstances, one of which is product differentiation. Distortions of such various forms actually 
limit the general implications of competition enhancing antitrust policy. For instance, if there are 
fixed costs of production, competition cannot push price down to marginal cost, and having firms 
specialize in differentiated goods is desirable. If one extends the model of Judd (1997) to include 
innovation, even then antitrust policy would be of dubious significance since the point of a patent 
is to give incentives for innovations. With no fixed costs and innovation, Judd (1997) shows that 
product differentiation induced monopoly distortions in capital goods market are more damaging 
than those in consumer goods market, implying that antitrust policy should give priority to 
intermediate goods market. 
 
One of Judd’s (1997) conclusions was that capital income subsidies could be paid directly to the 
investors, or to the firms in the form of investment tax credits or accelerated depreciation 
schedules. Since equipment markets are more distorted by market power, the capital subsidy 
should look similar to the investment tax credit (ITC) for new equipment, which has been 
occasionally part of the US tax code11. Guo & Lansing (1999) establish that the optimal capital 
                                                 
11 The ITC was an on-and-off policy device in the US. Its political sensitivity, and acceptability in general, is of 
some doubt. It was introduced in 1962, repealed in 1969, reintroduced in 1971, and finally eliminated in 1986. 
According to this policy firms receive a tax credit proportional to their purchase of new equipment but not 
structures. The ITC fluctuated between %0  and %10  until 1986 when it was completely eliminated. The US 
code currently includes a %20  tax credit for qualifying expenditures on research and development activities. In 
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subsidy result is a qualification of a much broader nonzero capital tax result. They model a capital 
tax code that involves depreciation allowance as a means to subsidize part of capital income12. 
They mainly argue that capital tax policy with imperfect competition is motivated by profit effect 
and underinvestment effect. Profit effect persuades welfare worsening investment which motivates 
the government to tax capital. The underinvestment effect, mainly due to discouraging private 
returns to capital, motivates the government to use investment-boosting subsidy. The optimal 
policy therefore depends on which effect dominates. If profit (underinvestment) effect dominates, 
the optimal policy is to tax (subsidize) capital. 
 
Essentially, these two results are complementing, and the two effect result is the more general 
version of Judd’s (1997) optimal capital subsidy result. Though Judd (1997) argued in favour of 
the original ITC proposal, implementing a capital subsidy is actually far from simple. Tax reforms 
in most industrialized countries have shown clear tendency of moving towards simplistic capital 
tax policy involving lower (or no) amount of direct subsidy to capital and minimum amount of 
deductions. The main two objectives behind these reforms are (a) to encourage competition and 
innovation amongst firms, and (b) to increase the amount of corporation tax revenue. Various 
incentive schemes including investment tax credits and property related tax shelters have been 
moderated or abolished in numerous countries, such as Australia, Austria, Finland, Germany, 
Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the US A. In addition, with a view to increasing corporate tax 
revenue some countries have reduced their corporate tax rate. The essential idea is that lower 
corporation tax rates provide lesser incentives for corporations to hide profits or evade taxes. 
Examples of this trend include Ireland (38% to 12.5%), Australia (36% to 30%), Denmark (32% 
to 30%), France (37.8% to 35.4%), Germany (52% to 39%), Iceland (30% to 18%) and the Czech 
Republic (31% to 26%), of which Iceland, Ireland, Denmark, France and the Czech Republic have 
experienced immediate effect of an increase in corporate tax receipts. But this increased receipt 
may well be at the cost of increasing the effective capital tax rate. Due to the cut in corporation tax 
rates, there has been a mixed response in the effective capital tax rates in these countries. For 
instance, this figure has increased from 18.6% to 18.7% for Ireland, from 19.2% to 23.1% in 
Czech Republic, and from 22.9% to 23.6% in France. By contrast, there has been a decline in the 
effective capital tax rate in Germany (21.1% to 19.9%), while in Australia it has remained 
unchanged at 28% (see for details, Carey & Tchilinguirian (2000)). 
 
If one considers capital movements across borders, the zero capital tax result is essentially the 
stronger one. In an integrated world where capital is relatively more mobile across borders, any 
                                                                                                                                            
the UK, a similar subsidy to capital investment is paid through corporate grants for the purchase of new capital 
goods. This policy was first introduced in 1967 and is still in practice.  
12 Depreciation allowances in excess of economic depreciation are another form of investment subsidy which is in 
practice, in a rather generous fashion, in both the US and the UK tax codes. For instance in the UK, starting from 
1972 the initial allowance received by industrial buildings ranged between 40% and 75%. Inventories received tax 
relief due to high inflation in the 1970s. According to the US corporate tax structure, physical rents from capital 
are taxed at a constant rate after the allowance of a deduction for depreciation. 
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tax on capital will shift capital from taxed country to an untaxed country. There are a number of 
channels through which domestic taxation of capital exerts international effects. For instance, 
domestic  taxes affect the international allocation of the existing stock of world capital. These taxes 
also affect international growth and the process of capital accumulation over time. A country’s 
capital tax reforms can influence the level of savings both at home and abroad, which in turn 
affects international rate of capital accumulation and economic growth. Moreover, domestic 
taxation of capital can be associated with different effects on economic growth and welfare. This 
may seem quite obvious since in an open economy tax reforms result in two distinct effects: one 
on domestic product, and the other on national income. Changes in welfare due to capital tax 
reforms induce important distributional effects, since such reforms have different effects on 
welfare of individuals at home and abroad. 
 
Two country models with overlapping generations has been quite popular in investigating a broad 
range of issues related to international capital taxation. An important contribution to this trend is 
Sibert (1985), which examines foreign investment taxation as a means to restricting capital 
mobility in a two country overlapping generations model. The main idea of Sibert (1985) is that 
since the degree of capital mobility affects gains from trade, incentive effects of capital 
accumulation, and intergenerational welfare, restricting capital mobility through foreign 
investment taxation affects all three. More specifically, Sibert (1985) shows that at least one 
country’s welfare is improved by taxation, and since investment taxation adversely affects savings 
rate, generational preference for a smaller or larger tax on foreign investment depends crucially on 
generational location which may be a capital-exporting or capital-importing country. The steady 
state incentive effects across borders also vary considerably for location-specific choice of small 
or large taxes. For instance, if the home country implements smaller taxes for home investors on 
the after-tax earnings from exported capital, the long run levels of foreign rental price of capital 
rises and home rental price of capital falls. Converse happens if the foreign country imposes a 
smaller tax on the earning of imported capital. 
 
The welfare effects of capital taxation in a large open economy have been examined and analyzed 
in a number of important papers. Palomba (2004) examines both the welfare and growth effects of 
international capital taxation, but the paper delivers much less robust policy prescriptions as 
compared to what closed economy models generally do. Nevertheless, there is one finding which 
is common in Palomba (2004) and its peers: in an open economy, there is a distinction between 
the effect of taxes on domestic product and the effect of taxes on residents’ claims on that product 
(national product). For instance, a country can increase domestic productivity and the growth rate 
of its product by lowering its taxes, but this may lower the level of domestic saving, which in turns 
reduces the claims of its citizens on future product and their welfare. Moreover, international tax 
interdependencies pose subtle problems of policy design to national governments. Governments 
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may use taxes on capital income both to compete for the existing stock of world capital and to 
affect the rate of capital accumulation over time. But a policy that increases the domestic share of 
current capital may not increase the growth rate of that capital in future. 
 
Furthermore, there are important issues related to cyclical properties of tax reforms, much of 
which is the main agenda in stochastic versions of two country models. Kim & Kim (2005), for 
instance, develop an infinite horizon stochastic general equilibrium model of optimal taxation in 
two countries, and examine the possibility of welfare-improving active, contingent tax policies. 
They find that the cyclical properties of optimal tax rules can be significantly different in a closed 
and an open economy setting. More precisely, in a closed economy setting, optimal tax policy is 
countercyclical in capital income taxes, implying that optimal tax response to an increase in 
productivity is to increase capital tax rate. However in the open economy setting where capital 
moves across borders, optimal tax policy becomes procyclical in capital income taxes. The 
procyclical tax policy generates efficiency gains by correcting market incompleteness. 
 
 
Ramsey Policy in Developing Countries. 
 
The leap from the doctrines to the real world is a large one when it comes to taxation, and a larger 
one when it comes to taxation in developing countries. Implementing an optimal tax policy in 
developing countries is subject to many hurdles, some of which have not been highlighted or 
analyzed so far in this paper. For instance, there is a predominantly active informal sector in these 
countries, and transactions of such a sector cannot be taxed by the government. This amounts to 
incomplete taxation of factors, which in turns is likely to change the standard Ramsey tax 
principles and composition of revenues 13. In designing tax policy, developing countries must also 
consider the margin of deviation from tax system in other countries. This is because with 
commercial integration there is an issue of designing tax policy that is conducive to foreign 
investors and expatriate workers. Such integration also raises concerns of raising revenue with 
much less reliance on foreign trade taxation. 
 
Most workers in developing countries are typically employed in agriculture or in small informal 
enterprises. Looking at the International Labor Organization (ILO) 2002 report, on an average 
more than half of the total workforce of South Asian developing countries is employed in informal 
sectors. For India, Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh, this figure stands at 56%, 65%, 74% and 59%, 
respectively. The predominance of informal sector employment is also observed in other 
                                                 
13 From a broader perspective, incomplete taxation of factors may be attributable to an industrialized economy as 
well, where for instance there is an observed tax evasion tendency in the relatively more labor intensive service 
sector. Having no tax in informal sector may be tantamount to saying that there is complete tax evasion in the 
service sector. 
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developing countries, such as 75% in Ethiopia, 72% in Lithuania, 37% in Kenya, 32% in Mexico, 
and 43% in Fiji. As workers in the informal sector are seldom paid a regular, fixed wage, their 
earnings fluctuate. Because of surplus (or family) labor, in some cases their real marginal wage is 
zero, or some form of payment which is off the books. The base for an income tax in such 
economies is therefore difficult to calculate. Moreover, workers in these countries generally do not 
spend their earnings in large stores that keep accurate records of sales and inventories. As a result, 
modern means of raising revenue, such as income taxes and consumption taxes, play a rather 
vague role in these economies. 
 
Informal production sector has been formally modelled in the recent optimal taxation literature, 
albeit with simple technology and very selective focus on its consequences in fiscal policy. 
Penalosa & Turnovsky (2004) develop a two-sector model of Ramsey taxation where they assume 
that economic activities in one sector are informal, i.e. non-taxable by the government. Their 
model is in the spirit of Jones et al. (1993), but due to private factor allocation in informal sector 
their main attention is on optimal incomplete taxation. The main motivation of Penalosa & 
Turnovsky (2004) is to establish the Ramsey tax principles for developing countries. Saying that 
their simple model provides some very useful insights in pursuit of a rather obscure policy design 
problem will not be an overstatement. For instance, one of their findings is that the optimal capital 
tax in such a setting is nonzero irrespective of how the revenues are used. Moreover, the welfare 
maximizing labor tax and capital tax rates depend crucially on how the government uses the tax 
revenue, which may be simple redistribution, or investment in infrastructure. 
 
Implementing an optimal tax policy in developing countries is also subject to problems related to 
tax administration, some of which are of peculiar nature. It is difficult to create an efficient tax 
administration without a well educated and well trained staff, when money is lacking to pay good 
wages to tax officials and to computerize the operation, and when taxpayers have limited ability to 
keep accounts. There are concerns of corruption in tax administration and tax collection, a high 
tendency of tax evasion, and strong and influential corporate lobbies which, through campaign 
contribution, almost determine the policy to be implemented. Moreover, because of the informal 
structure of the economy and financial limitations, in many developing countries statistical and tax 
offices have inflexibility in generating and documenting reliable statistics. This lack of data 
prevents policymakers from assessing the potential impact of major changes to the tax system. As 
a consequence, marginal changes are often preferred over major structural changes, even when the 
latter are clearly preferable. 
 
A relatively more globally integrated developing country faces, on top of what has been discussed 
so far, another subset of problems in designing tax policy. The world price of an imported capital 
good is the social cost of capital for a small developing country. In such a case the optimal capital 
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subsidy result does not apply, since the country should not subsidize imported capital goods as 
long as its internal price equals the world price. This implies that policies like investment tax 
credit or any other investment subsidy have little scope in neutralizing monopoly distortions. This 
situation is further complicated if there are foreigners who own a domestic firm in a developing 
country which produces a monopolized capital service. Since the rent goes to the foreigners, the 
true social cost to the developing country is the monopoly price, which cannot justify the optimal 
capital subsidy principle. Finally, income tends to be disproportionately distributed within 
developing countries. Although raising high tax revenues in this situation ideally calls for the rich 
to be taxed more heavily than the poor, this is rarely reflected in their fiscal policy designs and 
reforms. The economic and political power of rich taxpayers often allows them to prevent fiscal 
reforms that would increase their own tax burdens. This problem is analogous to the influential 
corporate lobbying problem, and it is creating issues in industrialized countries as well. But the 
lobbying problem in developing countries have the worse effect, since it explains, albeit in part, 
why many developing countries have not fully exploited personal income and property taxes, and 
why their tax systems rarely achieve reasonable progressiveness. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks. 
 
This paper has attempted to establish the policy relevance of optimal tax rules drawn from the 
Ramsey tradition. It has analyzed the technical importance of Ramsey tax rules in practical policy 
design. One of its main purposes, though expressed in a subtle tone in its contents and discussions, 
was establishing a practical and rather impartial viewpoint towards the Ramsey tradition of 
optimal taxation. It was certainly not the intention of this paper to campaign for Ramsey tax rules 
by criticizing its substitutes or complements. Along the discussion, the paper has attempted to 
establish an unbiased view towards the importance of optimal tax rules in general, i.e. it has 
highlighted the strengths and usefulness of Ramsey tax rules as part of a set of efficient tax 
prescriptions. It has argued in favour of Ramsey tax rules by refuting its common criticisms only 
to highlight Ramsey tax rules’ value and significance in practical policy design.  
 
What the paper has argued is that Ramsey tax rules that summarize the optimal average taxes are 
important and relevant in designing fiscal policy, but they serve moderately to provide guidelines 
and insights into specific design of taxes. Criticisms of Ramsey tax rules on grounds of 
practicality is irrelevant, since the correct interpretation of Ramsey tax rules is linked to average 
levels and compositions of taxes rather than specific design of tax instruments. A Ramsey tax rule 
illustrates the macroeconomic tax rate on a taxable transaction which in turn reflects the optimal 
proportion of that particular transaction to be taxed. Given this formulation, and given the welfare 
maximizing objective, Ramsey tax rules are simply the normative benchmark level of effective tax 
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rates which are not subject to criticism from positive policy design perspective. A Ramsey tax rule 
can be practically implemented with a combination of different tax instruments; it is inappropriate 
to criticize a Ramsey model only because it serves little to find the right combination of specific 
tax instruments that achieves a Ramsey tax rule. 
 
The paper attaches a relatively high weight on the policy relevance of Ramsey rule for capital 
taxation. The underlying intuition of the two most popular results in this issue is clear and attracts 
widespread acceptability. The Ramsey rule for labor taxation is drawn from Ramsey’s original 
inverse elasticity rule. In a dynamic economy optimal labor taxes with competitive markets should 
be smooth and roughly constant over time. This result stands robust for standard Ramsey tax 
models, and proponents of flat rate taxes also support this rule on grounds of intra and 
intertemporal smoothing of consumption and labor allocation decisions. With imperfect 
competition, the optimal levels of labor tax rates are lower than what it would have been under 
perfectly competitive markets. This result reflects the differential tax treatment of labor working 
under monopoly power in pricing and/or wage setting. 
 
The optimal policy for labor taxation is much debated on its progressivism, an issue which is 
much better handled in the Mirrlees tradition of optimal taxation. The degree of abstraction often 
embedded in Mirrlees tradition’s models of optimal nonlinear taxation, however, may limit the 
policy relevance of their results. For instance, one often cited result is that the marginal tax rate on 
the highest income person, who presumably has the highest ability, is zero. The intuition behind 
this result is that a nonzero marginal tax rate distorts the labor supply of the highest ability person. 
If this tax rate were changed to zero, the highest ability person might work more, which would 
make that person better off. However, government revenue would not change, because with a 
positive tax rate this labor is not provided, and with a zero tax rate the extra labor supply is not 
taxed. The logic of this argument applies only at the top of the income distribution, because 
changes in marginal tax rates below this level affect the taxes paid by people with higher incomes. 
This result however does not give any information about how high marginal tax rates should be 
just below the top of the income distribution. Also, from a practical standpoint, it is almost 
impossible to determine the top of the ability or income distribution. 
 
Abstract issues like fairness and more generic issues like administrative and compliance costs are 
typically embedded in the social welfare function and the welfare maximizing process of a 
Ramsey tax model. Such simplifications aid analytical tractability of the policies that are welfare 
maximizing or distortion minimizing. The efficiency-equity trade off argument, which stands 
more or less robust against any tax policy, is a relatively less important issue for Ramsey tax rules. 
This is because the equity issue is weighed away by emphasizing the minimization of disincentive 
effects of taxes. Put differently, since Ramsey tax rules weighs efficiency of taxes more than 
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fairness of taxes, they are in principle associated with minimum disincentive effects. But Ramsey 
tax rules have very little scope in fiscal policy design process of developing countries, largely due 
to a set of non-conventional factors that inhibit the scope of optimal policy analysis. 
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